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INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen a dramatic increase
in the scientific study of contemplative
practices. While seated meditation prac-
tices have historically been at the cen-
ter of inquiry in contemplative sciences,
movement-based practices, such as yoga,
t’ai chi, qigong, and others, are cur-
rently coming to the forefront of this dis-
course. In her introduction to the present
Research Topic, Schmalzl et al. (2014)
introduce movement-based contemplative
practices (MBCP) and present their essen-
tial qualities: MBCPs are embodied and
attentive to kinesthetic and proprioceptive
sensations; are structured by intentional
movement; and are contemplative, that
is, characterized by deliberate observation
and non-judgmental awareness.
In this opinion paper, I focus on the
necessity of studying intentional and expe-
riential aspects of yoga as a MBCP, and on
the role of first-person experiential reports
in the neurophenomenological investiga-
tion of yoga and other MBCPs. I pro-
pose that the difference between yoga
as a contemplative practice and yoga as
a form of physical exercise needs to be
assessed through nuanced investigation of
subjective experience aimed at illuminat-
ing short- and long-term intentions and
goals underlying yoga practice as well




Theories of embodiment, such as enac-
tion (Thompson, 2005, 2007; Noe, 2006;
Stewart et al., 2010) stress the irreducible
foundational links between the mind, the
world and the body as conditions of
possibility for consciousness. Rooted in
the phenomenological tradition of Husserl
(1982) and Merleau-Ponty many embod-
ied mind theorists see movement not only
as a pragmatic function of interacting
with the world, but as a dynamic and
plastic way of knowing and as a forma-
tive root of one’s selfhood and subjec-
tivity (Morris, 2004, 2010). The concept
of a “lived body,” derived from Merleau-
Ponty (2012), reflects subjectivity condi-
tioned by kinesthetic patterns and bodily
habits throughout a lifetime. Yoga prac-
tice, in this view, consists of systematic
change and of deconditioning of the “lived
body” from its earlier habit patterns and
creating new patterns and neural connec-
tions. Contemporary neurophysiological
evidence lends support to the embodied
mind approaches, placing sensorimotor
“coupling” (Thompson and Varela, 2001)
between an individual’s moving body and
the world at the center of research on
subjective experience.
Recent research on contemplative
practices, predominantly focused on sit-
ting meditation, has suggested a role
of sustained contemplative training for
processes of neuroplasticity (Manna
et al., 2010), self-awareness (Vago and
Silbersweig, 2012) attention modulation,
(Lutz et al., 2008b; MacLean et al., 2010),
and emotion regulation (Lutz et al., 2008a;
Sahdra et al., 2011), among others.
Studying yoga as a MBCP would high-
light specific contributions of intentional
and dynamic bodily processes to embod-
ied cognition, including processes associ-
ated with intentional movement, attention
to bodily states, and brain changes linked
to variations in the experiential “lived
body” and in underlying nervous system
due to sustained physical andmental asana
practice.
Neurophenomenology (Varela, 1996;
Lutz and Thompson, 2003) is the pre-
ferred method of inquiry for contem-
porary contemplative neurosciences and
empirical studies of embodied and enac-
tive cognition. The defining feature of neu-
rophenomenology is the use of sophis-
ticated objective neurophysiological mea-
surements in conjunction with nuanced
first-person methodologies. Within this
framework, objective, and subjective data
are seen as mutually constraining and
informing, and dynamic methods of
examining conscious experience are pre-
ferred. Despite a historical distrust of
first-person reports by cognitive neuro-
scientists (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977),
recent years have seen an important rise
in the use of first-person methodolo-
gies both in the form of questionnaires
and phenomenologically-informed prac-
tices (Chalmers, 1999). Cognitive neu-
rosciences have gradually opened to the
integration of systematic analysis of first-
person reports (Overgaard et al., 2008),
and a number of rigorous approaches
to subjective data are now being devel-
oped. One methodology, known as “elic-
itation interview” (Petitmengin, 2006),
has been used in a number of studies,
including an investigation of epileptic aura
(Petitmengin et al., 2006) and the gen-
eration of scientific insight (Petitmengin,
2007).
YOGA AS CONTEMPLATIVE PRACTICE
While the contemporary form of asana
sequences ofHatha Yoga is relatively recent
(Gard et al., 2014), many schools (such
as Ashtanga Yoga and Iyengar Yoga) have
referred to the ancient text, Patanjali’s
Yoga Sutra (Miller, 1995; White, 2014), as
the philosophical source text defining and
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situating yoga practice on and off the mat.
According to the much cited passage from
the Yoga Sutra, the definition of the yoga
practice is: citta-vrtti-nirodha, translated
as “cessation of the turnings of thought”
(Miller, 1995). The goal of yoga, in the
traditional sense, can be conceptualized
as a “path to freedom” through “graduate
unwinding of misconceptions that allows
for fresh perceptions” (Miller, 1995); the
approach is similar to the traditional goal
of sitting meditation practices, i.e., the
concept of enlightenment. It would follow,
then, that in addition to the expected phys-
ical benefits of systematic exercise, yoga
would have a number of effects on the
mind, and that these effects would resem-
ble at least some of the outcomes observed
in meditation research.
One line of inquiry in current med-
itation research concerns the effort to
untangle the distinct effects that differ-
ent meditation practices may have on the
brain. Lutz et al. (2008b) have divided
meditation practices into two broad
categories of “open monitoring” and
“focused attention,” and Travis and Shear
(2010) have proposed a third category—
“automatic self-transcendence.” Josipovic
(2010) pointed out that some states cul-
tivated by meditation practices are not
currently conceptualized by cognitive neu-
rosciences, so the process of taxonomy
and classification needs to proceed in a
careful and highly interdisciplinary man-
ner. In hatha yoga, such as Ashtanga yoga
(Jois, 2010), practice is often structured
around focused attention on breathing
(pranayama) and postures (asana), while
a non-judgmental attitude and accep-
tance of one’s current psycho-physical
state can be characterized, in part, as
open monitoring. Furthermore, Ashtanga
yoga has been linked to the trait of
self-transcendence (Fiori et al., 2014),
suggesting that at least one, possibly all
(focused attention, open monitoring, and
self-transcendence), and perhaps other yet
unidentified experiential categories can be
applied to neurophenomenological yoga
research.
INTENTION
An integral part of contemplative practice,
intention, has been largely unexplored in
contemplative neurosciences. Goals, rea-
sons, and expectations of practitioners
need to be taken into consideration in
order to elucidate neural correlates of a
practice. Intentionality is understood in
phenomenology as an “aboutness” of con-
sciousness; consciousness is always a con-
sciousness “of something” (Roy, 1999).
Theories of enaction and embodied cog-
nition have incorporated these ideas into
a framework of perception and action
being oriented, motivated and purpose-
ful within the individual’s relationship
with the world. In cognitive science, how-
ever, intention is often used as a syn-
onym for doing something purposefully,
a motivated goal-oriented behavior, with
a certain disposition, and expectation.
Intentional behavior has been linked to
activity in the right posterior temporal
superior sulcus network, to the mirror
neuron system (Carter et al., 2011), and
to the reward system in humans, which
involves such structures as ventral striatum
(Fliessbach et al., 2007), ventral tegmen-
tal area (D’Ardenne et al., 2008), dorsal
striatum, putamen, and caudate nucleus
(Haruno and Kawato, 2006). What kinds
of rewards/expectations can one study in
yoga practitioners? Moreover, since con-
templative practices, including MBCPs,
typically involve long-term commitment,
how can one qualify neurophysiologi-
cal changes before/during/after yoga prac-
tice taking into account various possible
expectations/rewards associated with an
individual practitioner’s motivation?
In contemplative practices in gen-
eral, setting and maintaining of intention
plays an important ritualistic and moti-
vational role, especially in the early stages
of practice. Within meditation practices,
method and intentions vary between still-
ing focused attention, open monitoring,
self-transcendence, and compassion-based
training. Recent meditation research has
started to unearth some of the neural
correlates of intentional contemplative
practices. Focused attention meditation
recruits attentional networks including
insula, anterior cingulate, frontal-parietal
regions, and dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex (Dickenson et al., 2013). Further,
increased functional connectivity between
intrinsic and extrinsic networks was
reported in practitioners of non-dual
awareness (Josipovic, 2014). Finally, recent
research on compassion meditation train-
ing showed alterations in inferior parietal
cortex and DPLFC, networks underlying
social cognition and emotion regulation
(Weng et al., 2013). Studying neural mech-
anisms of yoga practice may involve an
interaction between processes of inten-
tional reward-oriented behaviors and
different kinds of contemplative focus.
However, intention setting in yoga has
not been widely studied, despite being
an integral part of the practice of some
yoga traditions (an opening prayer in
Ashtanga yoga being one such exam-
ple). One phenomenological study of
body-based therapeutic practices, includ-
ing yoga, presented compelling evidence
for the role of both long- and short-terms
goals and intentions in practitioners and
patients, including specific goals of cop-
ing with the present situation and gen-
eral motivations for exploring qualities of
embodiment through practice (Mehling
et al., 2011).
As a MBCP, yoga shares some of the
intentional, motivational and practical ele-
ments of meditation. As a form of exercise,
it contributes to overall physical health and
wellbeing. It is therefore crucial, in order to
conduct neurophenomenological research
on yoga and to investigate contempla-
tive and intentional dimensions, to factor
in various possible short- and long-term
intentions and goals that practitioners may
set for their practice.
NEUROPHENOMENOLOGY AND YOGA
Lastly, not only long and short-term inten-
tions, motivations and expectations may
have an effect on the neural correlates
of yoga practice; one’s subjective expe-
rience may also undergo a number of
cognitive-affective changes during prac-
tice. Indeed, temporal dynamics of a med-
itation experience have been shown to
change as a function of attentional and
awareness focus in the course of short
neurofeedback practices (Garrison et al.,
2013a). Since real-time neurofeedback or
high-resolution neuroimaging is unlikely
during yoga practice, autonomic system
measures can be employed in lieu of EEGs
or brain scans. For instance, a recent study
has used heart rate variability measures as
a proxy for affect regulation, along with
detailed first-person reports and subjec-
tive rating scales to show dynamic changes
in attention, affect and subjective expe-
rience of calm/activation during a yoga
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 85 | 2
Solomonova Solomonova yoga intention
session (Mackenzie et al., 2014). Research
potential for including first-person reports
in yoga research is further illustrated by
another recent study where women suffer-
ing from breast cancer were initiated into
Iyengar yoga practice; participants under-
went pre- and post-study interviews and
kept a journal for the duration of the study
(Thomas et al., 2014), revealing personal
perspectives on qualities of embodiment,
posture, and loss.
Studying the neural dynamics of
embodied contemplative practices in con-
junction with fluctuations in first-person
experience would provide invaluable
insight to outcome measures, and also to
the moment-to-moment changes in prac-
tice, experience and intention, which in
turn will help elucidate underlying brain
mechanisms and contribute to develop-
ment of interventions adapted to the needs
of specific target groups (e.g., Individuals
undergoing cancer treatment, depression,
anxiety, chronic pain, etc. . . ). The “lived
body” is changed by MBCPs, and these
changes can be qualitatively explored to
investigate both effects of specific MBCPs
and structure of embodied subjectivity in
general. While investigating the therapeu-
tic effect of yoga in various populations
has been the approach of choice, studying
healthy individuals involved in sustained
contemplative yoga practice (Fiori et al.,
2014) may illuminate long-term effects
of the practice. This approach has been
fruitful in meditation research both by
selecting “expert” meditators as partici-
pants (Nicholson, 2006; Khalsa et al., 2008;
Garrison et al., 2013b), and longitudinally,
during a 3-month long Shamatha medita-
tion retreat (MacLean et al., 2010; Saggar
et al., 2012; Jacobs et al., 2013). Studying
“expert” yoga practitioners can illumi-
nate important aspects of the practice, for
instance, some advanced yoga practices
emphasize the possibility of awareness
without sensory content, such as purusha
in the yogic tradition (Maehle, 2007).
This and other aspects of yoga need to
be assessed in a phenomenological way.
A neurophenomenological approach is
needed in order to assess long- and short-
term expectations as well as moment-to
moment fluctuations during yoga prac-
tice and their neural correlates. Lastly,
employing not only expert practitioners
but also practicing scientists (Desbordes
and Negi, 2013) may contribute to more
comprehensive and nuanced contem-
plative neuroscience of yoga and other
MBCPs.
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